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FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc

Posted on 18 November 2026
FreeBSD security notificat

=============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project

Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in the ocs_fc(4) driver

Category: core
Module: ocs_fc
Announced: 2026-11-17
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2026-11-03 08:56:14 UTC (stable/15, 15.1-STABLE)
2026-11-17 17:08:06 UTC (releng/15.1, 15.1-RELEASE-p7)
2026-11-03 09:00:17 UTC (stable/14, 14.5-STABLE)
2026-11-17 17:05:06 UTC (releng/14.5, 14.5-RELEASE-p4)
2026-11-17 17:04:08 UTC (releng/14.4, 14.4-RELEASE-p13)
CVE Name: CVE-2026-127752, CVE-2026-127753, CVE-2026-127754

For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.

I. Background

The ocs_fc(4) driver supports Emulex Fibre Channel host bus adapters in
both initiator and target modes. It provides a management interface to
userspace through /dev/ocsN device nodes.

II. Problem Description

Several vulnerabilities were found in the ocs_fc(4) driver.

The driver's ioctl(2) interface, which members of the operator group can
access, did not require superuser privileges and did not adequately
validate requests. Among other problems, it failed to bound
user-supplied buffer sizes and PCI configuration space offsets, and could
issue adapter commands referencing freed memory. (CVE-2026-127752)

The driver did not adequately validate the length of FCP command frames
received from initiators, and did not range check exchange identifiers
reported by the adapter, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory
accesses. (CVE-2026-127753)

When rejecting a Process Login (PRLI) request with an unsupported FC-4
type, the driver sent a second response for the same exchange, resulting
in a use-after-free. Any port which had completed a Port Login (PLOGI)
could trigger this with a single PRLI. Additionally, formatting the
adapter's active profile ID could overflow a stack buffer.
(CVE-2026-127754)

III. Impact

A local user in the operator group can use the ioctl(2) interface to
corrupt kernel memory or reprogram the adapter, potentially gaining full
control of the system. A remote port on the same Fibre Channel fabric
can trigger a use-after-free or out-of-bounds memory access in the
kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) or potentially arbitrary
code execution in the kernel.

IV. Workaround

No workaround is available, but systems without adapters supported by
ocs_fc(4) are not affected.

V. Solution

Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot the system.

Perform one of the following:

1) To update your vulnerable system installed from base system packages:

Systems running a 15.0-RELEASE or later version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or
arm64 platforms, which were installed using base system packages, can be
updated via the pkg(8) utility:

# pkg upgrade -r FreeBSD-base
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

2) To update your vulnerable system installed from binary distribution sets:

Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms
which were not installed using base system packages can be updated via the
freebsd-update(8) utility:

# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.

a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:76/ocs_fc.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:76/ocs_fc.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ocs_fc.patch.asc

b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:

# cd /usr/src
# patch -E -p0 < /path/to/patch

c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.

VI. Correction details

This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
following stable and release branches:

Branch/path Hash Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/15/ fab3594e208f stable/15-n286564
releng/15.1/ 0e43807b1535 releng/15.1-n283664
stable/14/ 5f5d5abc37d0 stable/14-n275444
releng/14.5/ 10783f288172 releng/14.5-n274908
releng/14.4/ c37ff9b36ee9 releng/14.4-n273809
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
particular commit:

# git show --stat <commit hash>

Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:

<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>

To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
nNNNNNN in the table above), run:

# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD

VII. References

<URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127752>
<URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127753>
<URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127754>

The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc.asc>

 

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