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SYM07-011.txt

Posted on 07 June 2007
Source : packetstormsecurity.org Link

 

SYM07-011: Symantec Reporting Server Password Disclosure
June 5, 2007

Risk Impact: Medium
Remote Access: Yes
Local Access: Yes
Authentication Required:Yes
Exploit available: No

Overview
The administrator password for Symantec Reporting Server could be disclosed after a failed login attempt.

Affected Product:
Reporting Server from version 1.0.197.0 up to the solution

Solution:
Reporting 1.0.224.0
Available with SAV 10.1 MR6 build 6000 (10.1.6.6000) or later


Details

Symantec Reporting Server is an optional web application within the Symantec System Center console that can be used to be used to create reports about Symantec Client Security and Symantec AntiVirus products in an enterprise network. Symantec was notified that a failed attempt to log in to the Reporting server could result in displaying a hashed version of the password. An attacker could potentially use the hashed password to gain access to the Reporting Server database with administrator rights.


Symantec Response

Symantec engineers confirmed that this vulnerability exists in the versions of Reporting Server included with Symantec Client Security 3.1 and SAV CE 10.1, as indicated in the table above. Updates have been released to address the vulnerability.

A successful attacker would gain access only to the Reporting Server database. The attacker would not automatically have access to other programs on the computer, unless the same account and password are used for other programs. As a best practice, the accounts created for managing Reporting Server should not use the same id and password as the users’ network login credentials.

During the internal review of the issue, Symantec engineers also identified and fixed aseparate issue which could allow an attacker disable the authentication system for the SCS Reporting server. If successfully exploited, this could allow a remote attacker to bypass authentication and access the reporting database.

Mitigation
- Uninstall Reporting Server if it is not being used
- Symantec Client Security Console and the Reporting Server interface should be restricted to trusted access only.
- Ensuring that the Console and Reporting are never visible external to the network greatly reduces opportunities for unauthorized remote access.
- User accounts for Reporting Server should be different than the user’s network login account.

Symantec is not aware of any customers impacted by this issue, or of any attempts to exploit the issue.

As a part of normal best practices, users should keep vendor-supplied patches for all application software and operating systems up-to-date. Symantec strongly recommends any affected customers update SAV Reporting immediately to protect against possible attempts to exploit this vulnerability.

Credit
Symantec would like to thank Mikko Korppi for reporting this issue, and coordinating with us on the response.

CVE
This issue is a candidate for inclusion in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems. The CVE initiative has assigned CVE-2007-3022 to this issue

Updates
Any future updates to this advisory, if required, will be posted on the Symantec Advisory page:
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/security/Content/2007.06.05.html

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Symantec Product Security Team.
________________________________________
Symantec takes the security and proper functionality of its products very
seriously. As founding members of the Organization for Internet Safety
(OISafety), Symantec follows the principles of responsible disclosure.
Symantec also subscribes to the vulnerability guidelines outlined by the
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC). Please contact
secure@symantec.com if you feel you have discovered security issue with a
Symantec product.
Copyright (c) 2007 by Symantec Corp.

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