Home / vulnerabilities ASPR-2007-05-14-1.txt
Posted on 21 May 2007
Source : packetstormsecurity.org Link
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PUBLIC
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ACROS Security Problem Report #2007-05-14-1
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ASPR #2007-05-14-1: Session Fixation Vulnerability in HP SIM 5.0
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Document ID: ASPR #2007-05-14-1-PUB
Vendor: HP (http://www.hp.com)
Target: HP Systems Insight Manager
Impact: A session fixation vulnerability in HP SIM 5.0 SP4/5 can
be exploited to run arbitrary comands on the servers
system
Severity: High
Status: Fixed in SIM 5.1
Discovered by: Luka Treiber and Aljosa Ocepek of ACROS Security
Current version
http://www.acrossecurity.com/aspr/ASPR-2007-05-14-1-PUB.txt
Summary
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There is a session fixation vulnerability [1] in HP Systems Insight
Manager 4.2 and 5.0 SP4/5 (IM) that allows an attacker to gain
administrative access to IM console. As a result, the attacker can take
complete administrative control over all managed systems, upload and
execute malicious code on them, extract any information from them and
disable them at her will.
Product Coverage
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- HP Systems Insight Manager 4.2 - affected
- HP Systems Insight Manager 5.0 SP4 - affected
- HP Systems Insight Manager 5.0 SP5 - affected
- HP Systems Insight Manager 5.1 - not affected
Analysis
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The Systems Insight Manager web application is using a JSESSIONID session
cookie for maintaining a session with administrator's browser. Apparently,
the console is vulnerable to session fixation [1] and allows an attacker
to obtain the session cookie, fix it on administrator's browser and thus
force him to use that cookie when subsequently logging into the
administration console. Once the administrator is logged in, the attacker
can use the same cookie to enter the already logged-in session and assume
the identity of the administrator.
After gaining administrative rights, an attacker can do anything the
administrator could do, including executing arbitrary commands on all
managed computers. In SIM Service Pack 4, a new cookie JSESSIONIDSSO was
introduced to fix this issue; however, it was possible to bypass checks
for the JSESSIONIDSSO cookie and thus still attack the SIM administrator
with a fixed JSESSIONID cookie.
Solution
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HP has released a newer version of SIM (SIM 5.1) which fixes this issue.
References
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[1] ACROS Security, "Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web-based
Applications"
http://www.acrossecurity.com/papers/session_fixation.pdf
[2] Hewlett-Packard Security Bulletin
http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bizsupport/TechSupport/Document.jsp?
objectID=c01049713
Acknowledgments
===============
We would like to acknowledge HP Software Security Response Team (SSRT)
for diligent and professional handling of the identified vulnerability.
Contact
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ACROS d.o.o.
Makedonska ulica 113
SI - 2000 Maribor
e-mail: security@acrossecurity.com
web: http://www.acrossecurity.com
phone: +386 2 3000 280
fax: +386 2 3000 282
ACROS Security PGP Key
http://www.acrossecurity.com/pgpkey.asc
[Fingerprint: FE9E 0CFB CE41 36B0 4720 C4F1 38A3 F7DD]
ACROS Security Advisories
http://www.acrossecurity.com/advisories.htm
ACROS Security Papers
http://www.acrossecurity.com/papers.htm
ASPR Notification and Publishing Policy
http://www.acrossecurity.com/asprNotificationAndPublishingPolicy.htm
Disclaimer
==========
The content of this report is purely informational and meant only for the
purpose of education and protection. ACROS d.o.o. shall in no event be
liable for any damage whatsoever, direct or implied, arising from use or
spread of this information. All identifiers (hostnames, IP addresses,
company names, individual names etc.) used in examples and demonstrations
are used only for explanatory purposes and have no connection with any
real host, company or individual. In no event should it be assumed that
use of these names means specific hosts, companies or individuals are
vulnerable to any attacks nor does it mean that they consent to being used
in any vulnerability tests. The use of information in this report is
entirely at user's risk.
Revision History
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May 14, 2007: Initial release
Copyright
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(c) 2007 ACROS d.o.o. Forwarding and publishing of this document is
permitted providing the content between "[BEGIN-ACROS-REPORT]" and
"[END-ACROS-REPORT]" marks remains unchanged.
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