Home / vulnerabilities OpenPKG-SA-2006.037.txt
Posted on 09 December 2006
Source : packetstormsecurity.org Link
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Publisher Name: OpenPKG GmbH
Publisher Home: http://openpkg.com/
Advisory Id (public): OpenPKG-SA-2006.037
Advisory Type: OpenPKG Security Advisory (SA)
Advisory Directory: http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA
Advisory Document: http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA-2006.037
Advisory Published: 2006-12-07 23:21 UTC
Issue Id (internal): OpenPKG-SI-20061128.01
Issue First Created: 2006-11-28
Issue Last Modified: 2006-12-07
Issue Revision: 12
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Subject Name: GnuPG
Subject Summary: OpenPGP cryptography tool
Subject Home: http://www.gnupg.org/
Subject Versions: 1.* <= 1.4.5 && 2.* <= 2.0.1
Vulnerability Id: CVE-2006-6169, CVE-2006-6235
Vulnerability Scope: global (not OpenPKG specific)
Attack Feasibility: run-time
Attack Vector: remote network
Attack Impact: denial of service, arbitrary code execution
Description:
Two security issues were discovered in the OpenPGP cryptography
tool GnuPG [0], versions up to and including 1.4.5 and 2.0.1.
The first issue [1] is a heap-based buffer overflow which has been
identified by the vendor during fixing a bug reported by Hugh
Warrington [2]. The problem is that the GnuPG internal function
make_printable_string() is supposed to replace possible dangerous
characters from a prompt and returns an allocated string. This
string may be longer than the original one, but the buffer for the
prompt is only be allocated at the size of the original string. The
flaw might allow attackers to cause a denial of service or even
execute arbitrary code via messages with "C-escape" expansions.
The second issue [3] is a memory management problem. GnuPG uses
data structures called filters to process OpenPGP messages. For
communication between filters, context structures are used. These
are usually allocated on the stack and passed to the filter
functions. At most places the OpenPGP data stream fed into these
filters is closed before the context structure gets deallocated.
While decrypting encrypted packets, this may not happen in all
cases and the filter may use a void context structure filled with
garbage. An attacker may control this garbage. The filter context
includes another context used by the low-level decryption to access
the decryption algorithm. This is done using a function pointer.
By carefully crafting an OpenPGP message, an attacker may control
this function pointer and call an arbitrary function of the process.
This is a remotely exploitable bug and affects any use of GnuPG
where an attacker can control the data processed by GnuPG. It is
not necessary limited to encrypted data, also signed data may be
affected.
References:
[0] http://www.gnupg.org/
[1] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q4/000241.html
[2] https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue728
[3] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q4/000246.html
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Primary Package Name: gnupg
Primary Package Home: http://openpkg.org/go/package/gnupg
Corrected Distribution: Corrected Series: Corrected Package:
OpenPKG Enterprise E1.0-SOLID gnupg-1.4.5-E1.0.1
OpenPKG Community 2-STABLE-20061018 gnupg-1.4.6-2.20061207
OpenPKG Community 2-STABLE gnupg-1.4.6-2.20061207
OpenPKG Community CURRENT gnupg-1.4.6-20061206
OpenPKG Community CURRENT gnupg2-2.0.1-20061207
____________________________________________________________________________
For security reasons, this document was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key of the OpenPKG GmbH (public key id 61B7AE34)
which you can download from http://openpkg.com/openpkg.com.pgp
or retrieve from the OpenPGP keyserver at hkp://pgp.openpkg.org/.
Follow the instructions at http://openpkg.com/security/signatures/
for more details on how to verify the integrity of this document.
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