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asterisk-dos.txt
Posted on 20 March 2007
Source : packetstormsecurity.org Link

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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MADYNES Security Advisory

<http://madynes.loria.fr/> http://madynes.loria.fr

Title: Asterisk SIP INVITE remote DOS

Release Date:

08/03/2007

Severity:

High - Denial of Service

Advisory ID:KIPH1

Software:

Asterisk

<http://www.asterisk.org/> http://www.asterisk.org/

AsteriskR is a complete IP PBX in software. It runs on a wide variety of
operating systems including Linux, Mac OS X, OpenBSD, FreeBSD and Sun
Solaris and provides all of the features you would expect from a PBX
including many advanced features that are often associated with high end
(and high cost) proprietary PBXs. AsteriskR supports Voice over IP in many
protocols, and can interoperate with almost all standards-based telephony
equipment using relatively inexpensive hardware.

Affected Versions:

Asterisk 1.2.14, 1.2.15, 1.2.16

Asterisk 1.4.1

probably previous versions also

Unaffected Versions: Trunk version to date (13/03/2007)

Vulnerability Synopsis: After sending a crafted INVITE message the software
finish abruptly its execution with a Segmentation Fault provoking a Denial
of Service (DoS) in all the services provided by the entity.

Impact: A remote individual can remotely crash and perform a Denial of
Service(DoS) attack in all the services provided by the software by sending
one crafted SIP INVITE message. This is conceptually similar to the "ping of
death".

Resolution: The problem has been fixed in Asterisk versions 1.4.2 and
1.2.17, which is released today 19/03/2007

Vulnerability Description: After sending a crafted message the software
crash abruptly. The message in this case is an anonymous INVITE where the
SDP contains 2 connection headers. The first one must be valid and the
second not where the IP address should be invalid. The callee needs not to
be a valid user or dialplan. In case where asterisk is set to disallow
anonymous call, a valid user and password should be known, and while
responding the corresponding INVITE challenge the information should be
crafted as above. After this crafted SIP INVITE message, the affected
software crash immediately.

Proof of Concept Code: available

Credits:

Humberto J. Abdelnur (Ph.D Student)

Radu State (Ph.D)

Olivier Festor (Ph.D)

This vulnerability was identified by the Madynes research team at
INRIA

Lorraine, using the Madynes VoIP fuzzer.

<http://madynes.loria.fr/> http://madynes.loria.fr/

Disclosure Distribution:

The advisory will be posted on the following websites:

1) Asterisk's website

2) <http://madynes.loria.fr/> http://madynes.loria.fr website

The advisory will be posted to the following mailing lists:

1) full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk

2) voipsec@vopisa.org

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<html xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" =
xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii">
<meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11 (filtered medium)">
<o:SmartTagType =
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
name=3D"State"/>
<o:SmartTagType =
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
name=3D"PlaceType"/>
<o:SmartTagType =
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
name=3D"PlaceName"/>
<o:SmartTagType =
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
name=3D"place" downloadurl=3D"http://www.5iantlavalamp.com/"/>

<style>

</style>

</head>

<body lang=3DFR link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

MADYNES Security
Advisory <o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

<a
href=3D"http://madynes.loria.fr/">http://madynes.loria.fr</a><o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Title: =
Asterisk
SIP INVITE remote DOS  <o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Release Date:<o:p></o:p>

      =
08/03/2007<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Severity: <o:p></o:p>

      High -
Denial of  Service<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Advisory ID:KIPH1<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Software:<o:p></o:p>

      =
Asterisk<o:p></o:p>

      <a
href=3D"http://www.asterisk.org/">http://www.asterisk.org/</a><o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Asterisk®
is a complete IP PBX in software. It runs on a wide variety of operating
systems including Linux, Mac OS X, OpenBSD, FreeBSD and Sun Solaris and
provides all of the features you would expect from a PBX including many
advanced features that are often associated with high end (and high =
cost)
proprietary PBXs. Asterisk® supports Voice over IP in many =
protocols, and can
interoperate with almost all standards-based telephony equipment using
relatively inexpensive hardware.<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Affected
Versions:<o:p></o:p>

      Asterisk
1.2.14, 1.2.15, 1.2.16 <o:p></o:p>

      Asterisk
1.4.1 <o:p></o:p>

      probably
previous versions also<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Unaffected
Versions: Trunk version to date =
(13/03/2007)<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Vulnerability
Synopsis: After sending a crafted INVITE message the software finish =
abruptly
its execution with a Segmentation Fault provoking a Denial of Service =
(DoS) in
all the services provided by the entity.<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Impact:
A remote individual can remotely crash and perform a Denial of =
Service(DoS) attack
in all the services provided by the software by sending one crafted SIP =
INVITE
message. This is conceptually similar to the "ping of death". =
<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Resolution: The problem
has been fixed in Asterisk versions 1.4.2 and 1.2.17, which is released =
today 19/03/2007
<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Vulnerability
Description: After sending a crafted message the software crash =
abruptly. The
message in this case is an anonymous INVITE where the SDP contains 2 =
connection
headers. The first one must be valid and the second not where the IP =
address
should be invalid. The callee needs not to be a valid user or dialplan. =
In case
where asterisk is set to disallow anonymous call, a valid user and =
password
should be known, and while responding the corresponding INVITE challenge =
the
information should be crafted as above. After this crafted SIP INVITE =
message,
the affected software crash immediately. <o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Proof =
of Concept
Code: available<o:p></o:p>

 <o:p></o:p>

Credits:<o:p></o:p>

      Humberto J.
Abdelnur (Ph.D Student)<o:p></o:p>

      <st1:place
w:st=3D"on"><st1:PlaceName w:st=3D"on">Radu</st1:PlaceName> =
<st1:PlaceType w:st=3D"on">State</st1:PlaceType></st1:place>
(Ph.D)<o:p></o:p>

      Olivier
Festor (Ph.D)<o:p></o:p>

      This
vulnerability was identified by the Madynes research team at =
INRIA<o:p></o:p>

      <st1:place
w:st=3D"on"><st1:State w:st=3D"on">Lorraine</st1:State></st1:place>, =
using the
Madynes VoIP fuzzer.<o:p></o:p>

      <a
href=3D"http://madynes.loria.fr/">http://madynes.loria.fr/</a><o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

Disclosure
Distribution: <o:p></o:p>

      The
advisory will be posted on the following =
websites:<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

      1)    Asterisk's
website<o:p></o:p>

      2)    =
<a
href=3D"http://madynes.loria.fr/">http://madynes.loria.fr</a> website<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

      The
advisory will be posted to the following mailing =
lists:<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

      1)    =
full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk<o:p></o:p>

      2)    =
voipsec@vopisa.org<o:p></o:p>

<o:p> </o:p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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