perfact::mpa Cross Site Request Forgery
Posted on 01 March 2016
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Advisory ID: SYSS-2015-071 Product(s): perfact::mpa Manufacturer: PerFact Innovation GmbH & Co. KG Affected Version(s): Custom versions using PerFact DB_Utils (Toolkit) < v3.2 Tested Version(s): Custom version with PerFact DB_Utils (Toolkit) < v3.2 Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CWE-352) Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: Fixed Manufacturer Notification: 2015-12-18 Solution Date: 2016-01-18 Public Disclosure: 2016-02-29 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Authors of Advisory: Matthias Deeg and Sven Freund (SySS GmbH) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: The software solution perfact::mpa is a software architecture that, for instance, is used to build web applications for the secure and reliable remote maintenance of machines via the Internet (see [1]). According to the manufacturer, remote control software built with perfact::mpa impresses through the following features: * location-independent and central monitoring, * maintenance and error management, * authorized remote access, and * integrated documentation of incidents and services. Due to missing protection mechanisms, the web application perfact::mpa is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The tested web application perfact::mpa offers no protection against cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks. This kind of attack forces end users respectively their web browsers to perform unwanted actions in a web application context in which they are currently authenticated. CSRF attacks specifically target state-changing requests, for example in order to enable or disable a feature, and not data theft, as an attacker usually has no possibility to see the response of the forged request. In general, CSRF attacks are conducted with the help of the victim, for example by a user visiting an attacker-controlled URL sent by e-mail in its web browser. Often, cross-site request forgery attacks make use of cross-site scripting attacks, but this is not mandatory. CSRF attacks can also be performed against a web application if a victim is only visiting an attacker-controlled web server. In this case, the attacker-controlled web server is used to generate a specially crafted HTTP request in the context of the user's web browser which is then sent to the vulnerable target web application. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The SySS GmbH could successfully demonstrate a CSRF attack against the perfact::mpa web application by using the found persistent cross-site scripting vulnerability in the file upload functionality (see security advisory SYSS-2015-066). The following JavaScript attack vector was used which was automatically executed when the uploaded attacker-controlled HTML file was opened by a victim. <script>location.href="https://<HOST>/<PATH>/MPA2/External/ExtAdmin/db_edit_action ?layout_tabnum=&id=&selector_copy_from=&do_delete=&delete_next_id=&do_save=Speichern &name=<NAME>&random_password=<PASSWORD>&password=<PASSWORD>&password_repeat=<PASSWORD> &fullname=<FULL_NAME>&email=<EMAIL>&phone=&passwordexpires= &passwordexpires_date=&passwordexpires_time=&disabled%3Adefault=";</script> If this attack vector was executed in the context of a perfact::mpa system administrator, a new external administrator with the defined account data would be created. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: According to information by the PerFact Innovation GmbH & Co. KG, the described security issue has been fixed in PerFact DB_Utils (toolkit) software version 3.2. Please contact the manufacturer for further information or support. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2015-12-18: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2016-01-18: Response from manufacturer with detailed information about the reported security vulnerability and its solution status 2016-02-05: E-mail to manufacturer according two open questions 2016-02-05: Response from manufacturer with further information 2016-02-29: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] Product Web Site for perfact::mpa http://perfact.de/mpa/index_html [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2015-071 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2015-071.txt [3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg and Sven Freund of the SySS GmbH. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB E-Mail: sven.freund (at) syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Sven_Freund.asc Key fingerprint = DCDB 7627 C1E3 9CE8 62DF 2666 8A5F A853 415D 46DC ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web site. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJW0/ASAAoJENmkv2o0rU2rkh8P/RVnz8RKPTTCTFhyLQDbLde7 Wi5K/34T2JffZKEspK4nz5UcXp5nYNdA5myvCFgVfkZDwCjO61RtOJDFZaJpunMK AIbzMdR33hretpoZgdxOuD18pFIBbxOcTT7BlL+DgcTGqZNzXKMuQvgmwkyS8nU5 7mg7DTKFX4w1r+t1G2XmVU9uSVk5PFVeKkaZLcVue9L+3JUTuLe9foG4teO23Sw3 tXbJ201VWmavZfVJMKX4qku8X0PxQj0BJ7gp9oGIpnHis/MeJqBVeqGJVnqMqJe1 lWoi0nmOZNFf1ty57rQ/DgHqfpOO2N8rfoQpXzYx5aXU3pFoPhlL/k187EiuhAmU yO9T9dlYq1iprMcNyeNj2JppsHRkFgCBEzKdpqWPxXDS5kXveIlsiAFSUR1uiouS pe+8OXRaj/ErsaBywMjLUBHJwaVr2fRm21aFv4ie9BuGeA8CR9QTO3E0y+Nvu7Av hVQjFm0Jga3npOnq3gy2l2UjwMql/ehIYE177LfYl9hK5Uhtl5sRhdAYCkDcINhc IH+c63uwKBDFRWyqTMB2DG5iIe8ZmuRivUnhaGqJy0vvulIu8FdwZg8DTN6eDjZL Mjth9vK//cwE2wDlQ6Wr5JarO5ZOidjSkvYzPJUriqneHz0gUH+zWgQA9/Zv7xc3 yIW9LXJi5atDQXz2P51c =jjvR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
