Atlassian Confluence AppFusions Doxygen 1.3.x Information Disclosure
Posted on 21 November 2016
RCE Security Advisory https://www.rcesecurity.com 1. ADVISORY INFORMATION ======================= Product: AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence Vendor URL: www.appfusions.com Type: Information Exposure Through an Error Message [CWE-209] Date found: 2016-06-29 Date published: - CVSSv3 Score: 4.3 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) CVE: - 2. CREDITS ========== This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from RCE Security. 3. VERSIONS AFFECTED ==================== AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.3 AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.2 AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.1 AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.0 older versions may be affected too. 4. INTRODUCTION =============== With Doxygen in Confluence, you can embed full-structure code documentation: -Doxygen blueprint in Confluence to allow Doxygen archive imports -Display documentation from annotated sources such as Java (i.e., JavaDoc), C++, Objective-C, C#, C, PHP, Python, IDL (Corba, Microsoft, and UNO/OpenOffice flavors), Fortran, VHDL, Tcl, D in Confluence. -Navigation supports code structure (classes, hierarchies, files), element dependencies, inheritance and collaboration diagrams. -Search documentation from within Confluence -Restrict access to who can see/add what -Doxygen in JIRA also available (from the vendor's homepage) 5. VULNERABILITY DETAILS ======================== The application offers the functionality to import Doxygen documentations via a file upload to make it available in a Confluence page, but does not properly validate the "file" HTTP GET parameter, which is used to retrieve the uploaded contents. In DoxygenFileServlet.java (lines 82-105) the "file" GET parameter is read and used as part of a File object: private void renderContent(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws IOException { String pathInfo = request.getPathInfo(); String[] pathInfoParts = pathInfo.split("file/"); String requestedFile = pathInfoParts[1]; File homeDirectory = this.applicationProperties.getHomeDirectory(); String doxygenDir = homeDirectory.getAbsolutePath() + File.separator + "doxygen"; File file = new File(doxygenDir, requestedFile); String contentType = this.getServletContext().getMimeType(file.getName()); if (contentType == null) { contentType = "application/octet-stream"; } response.setContentType(contentType); FileInputStream inputStream = null; ServletOutputStream outputStream = null; try { inputStream = new FileInputStream(file); outputStream = response.getOutputStream(); IOUtils.copy((InputStream)inputStream, (OutputStream)outputStream); } finally { IOUtils.closeQuietly((InputStream)inputStream); IOUtils.closeQuietly((OutputStream)outputStream); } } Since there is no exception handling for the opening of the file, this results in a local server path disclosure within Atlassian Confluence if a non-existing page is requested like: http://localhost:8090/plugins/servlet/doxygen/TEST/file/non-existent This throws the following Stack Trace revealing the full system path. Cause java.io.FileNotFoundException: /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/doxygen/non-existent (No such file or directory) at java.io.FileInputStream.open0(Native Method) Stack Trace:[hide] java.io.FileNotFoundException: /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/doxygen/non-existent (No such file or directory) at java.io.FileInputStream.open0(Native Method) at java.io.FileInputStream.open(FileInputStream.java:195) at java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(FileInputStream.java:138) 6. RISK ======= To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be authenticated and must have the rights within Atlassian Confluence to read uploaded Doxygen files (default). The vulnerability allows remote attackers to obtain the local server path and use it as a supplying information in further attacks like RCESEC-2016-007. 7. SOLUTION =========== Update to AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.4 8. REPORT TIMELINE (DD/MM/YYYY) =============================== 23/08/2016: Discovery of the vulnerability 23/08/2016: Sent preliminary advisory incl. PoC to known mail address 30/08/2016: No response, sent out another notification 30/08/2016: Vendor response, team is working on it 20/10/2016: Vendor releases v1.3.4 which fixes this vulnerability 29/11/2016: Advisory released 9. REFERENCES ============= -
