Wireshark dissect_pktc_rekey Heap-based Out-of-Bounds Read
Posted on 30 November -0001
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Wireshark dissect_pktc_rekey Heap-based Out-of-Bounds Read</TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY>The following crash due to a heap-based out-of-bounds read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"): --- cut --- ==17304==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61b00001335c at pc 0x0000004507c1 bp 0x7fff09b13420 sp 0x7fff09b12bd0 READ of size 1431 at 0x61b00001335c thread T0 #0 0x4507c0 in __interceptor_strlen llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:581 #1 0x7fead8aeeb02 in g_strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x65b02) #2 0x7feae0a0b1ef in string_fvalue_set_string wireshark/epan/ftypes/ftype-string.c:51:30 #3 0x7feae09e83f8 in fvalue_set_string wireshark/epan/ftypes/ftypes.c:530:2 #4 0x7feae0867874 in proto_tree_set_string wireshark/epan/proto.c:3572:3 #5 0x7feae088ae05 in proto_tree_add_string wireshark/epan/proto.c:3478:2 #6 0x7feae088b135 in proto_tree_add_string_format_value wireshark/epan/proto.c:3492:7 #7 0x7feae213aa61 in dissect_pktc_rekey wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c:436:5 #8 0x7feae2139f71 in dissect_pktc wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c:624:16 #9 0x7feae08130d1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:626:8 #10 0x7feae0805a4a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:701:9 #11 0x7feae080521d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1160:9 #12 0x7feae0805dc4 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1186:9 #13 0x7feae296ebf5 in decode_udp_ports wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:583:7 #14 0x7feae297dc90 in dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1081:5 #15 0x7feae29719d0 in dissect_udp wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1087:3 #16 0x7feae08130d1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:626:8 #17 0x7feae0805a4a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:701:9 #18 0x7feae080521d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1160:9 #19 0x7feae19601db in ip_try_dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:1978:7 #20 0x7feae19cf7c1 in dissect_ipv6 wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ipv6.c:2431:14 #21 0x7feae08130d1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:626:8 #22 0x7feae0805a4a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:701:9 #23 0x7feae080521d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1160:9 #24 0x7feae0805dc4 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1186:9 #25 0x7feae1fde9c9 in dissect_null wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-null.c:458:12 #26 0x7feae08130d1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:626:8 #27 0x7feae0805a4a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:701:9 #28 0x7feae080521d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1160:9 #29 0x7feae1542dd5 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:493:11 #30 0x7feae08130d1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:626:8 #31 0x7feae0805a4a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:701:9 #32 0x7feae080f58e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2674:8 #33 0x7feae0800f4f in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2687:8 #34 0x7feae0800324 in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:509:3 #35 0x7feae07b36c9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:376:2 #36 0x52f11b in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3748:5 #37 0x52840c in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3504:11 #38 0x51e71c in main wireshark/tshark.c:2213:13 0x61b00001335c is located 0 bytes to the right of 1500-byte region [0x61b000012d80,0x61b00001335c) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4c2148 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40 #1 0x7fead8ad7610 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4e610) #2 0x7feaed2fef08 in wtap_open_offline wireshark/wiretap/file_access.c:1082:2 #3 0x52473d in cf_open wireshark/tshark.c:4215:9 #4 0x51e12d in main wireshark/tshark.c:2204:9 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:581 in __interceptor_strlen Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c367fffa610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fffa620: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fffa630: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fffa640: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fffa650: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c367fffa660: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[04]fa fa fa fa 0x0c367fffa670: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c367fffa680: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c367fffa690: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fffa6a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fffa6b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==17304==ABORTING --- cut --- The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12242. Attached is a file which triggers the crash. </BODY></HTML>
