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rt-sa-2007-001.txt

Posted on 18 September 2007

Advisory: Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Remote Command Execution RedTeam Pentesting discovered a remote command execution in the Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX during a penetration test. The masterCGI script of the OmniPXC integrated communication solution web interface is vulnerable to a remote command execution. Attackers can run arbitrary commands with the permissions of the web application user. Details ======= Product: Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Affected Versions: All versions up to and including R7.1 Fixed Versions: All supported versions Vulnerability Type: Remote Command Execution Security-Risk: high Vendor-URL: http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/psirt/statements.htm reference number 2007002 Vendor-Status: Informed, patch available Advisory-URL: http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2007-001.php Advisory-Status: public CVE: CVE-2007-3010 CVE-URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-3010 Introduction ============ "The OmniPCX Enterprise is an integrated communications solution for medium-sized businesses and large corporations. It combines the best of the old (legacy TDM phone connectivity) with the new (a native IP platform and support for Session Initiation Protocol, or SIP) to provide an effective and complete communications solution for cost-conscious companies on the cutting edge." (from the vendor's homepage) More Details ============ The OmniPCX web interface has a CGI script "masterCGI" which offers a "ping" functionality. By running the script with the parameters "ping" and "user", one is able to ping any IP address reachable from the server the webinterface is running on. curl -k "https://www.example.com/cgi-bin/masterCGI?ping=nomip&user=127.0.0.1" The ping will be done on the server, running the ping program installed on it. The vulnerability lies in the "user" variable not being filtered when passed to the shell. Thus, arbitrary commands can be executed on the server by adding them to the user variable, separated by semicolons. Spaces have to be encoded by using the internal field separator ${IFS}, as any normal or URL encoded space will abort the command execution. Proof of Concept ================ curl -k "https://www.example.com/cgi-bin/masterCGI?ping=nomip&user=;ls${IFS}-l;" Workaround ========== Deactivate the Web server at the loss of some functionality not related to telephony service. Interpose a firewall allowing access to the web interface of the OXE to IP addresses who should have access to the server (e.g. maintenance technicians). Fix === Correct filtering of shell meta-characters and tighter access control have been implemented in all supported versions. Security Risk ============= The risk of this vulnerability is high. Any user which has access to the web interface of the OmniPCX Enterprise solution will be able to execute arbitrary commands on the server with the permissions of the webserver. History ======= 2007-05-07 First contact with head of technical staff of Alcatel-Lucent. Will relay the information to their technicians and call back with further information. 2007-05-09 Response with a pointer to the Alcatel-Lucent PSIRT and the website http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/psirt, where the process of reporting a security vulnerability is explained. The advisory gets mailed to the email address provided there. 2007-05-10 Advisory gets acknowledged by the PSIRT 2007-05-23 Vulnerability gets confirmed by Alcatel-Lucent 2007-06-18 CVE number assigned 2007-09-17 Coordinated public release with Alcatel-Lucent References ========== http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/psirt/statements.htm reference number 2007002 RedTeam Pentesting GmbH ======================= RedTeam Pentesting is offering individual penetration tests, short pentests, performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately. As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in security related areas. The results are made available as public security advisories. More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at http://www.redteam-pentesting.de. -- RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 963-1300 Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 963-1304 52068 Aachen http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/ Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004 Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen, Claus R. F. Overbeck

 

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