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Zurb Foundation 5.5.3 / 5.5.1 Cross Site Scripting

Posted on 30 November -0001

<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Zurb Foundation 5.5.3 / 5.5.1 Cross Site Scripting</TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY>XSS vulnerabilty in the tooltip plugin of Zurb Foundation 5.x ============================================================= URL to this advisory: https://nop.li/foundation5tooltipxss Vendor ====== http://zurb.com/ Product ======= (Taken from http://foundation.zurb.com/sites/docs/v/5.5.3/) Foundation is the most advanced, responsive front-end framework in the world. The framework is mobile friendly and ready for you to customize it any way you want to use it. Vulnerability Type ================== Cross-Site-Scripting Vulnerability CVE Reference ============= N/A Vulnerability Details ===================== The Foundation framework provides an easy way to insert tooltips into your code. The corresponding plugin for this is *foundation.tooltip.js*. Unfortunately the plugin takes HTML-encoded code from the title parameter and returns it as actual HTML, allowing an attacker to inject dynamic HTML/JS into an application, if the application allows to inject user input into title fields of a tooltip'ed SPAN entity. Even if the user input is correctly encoded, before adding it to the tooltip'ed SPAN, the Foundation Tooltip JavaScript will re-decode it and inject the actul HTML code. Example code ============ This code snippet shows a simple HTML page with encoded HTML in a tooltip, utilizing the Foundation JS plugin. <!DOCTYPE html> <html class="no-js" lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport"> <title>Foundation 5 Tooltip XSS example</title> <script src="/foundation/js/vendor/modernizr.js"></script> <link href="/css/vpnauth.css" rel="stylesheet"> <link href="/css/font-awesome.min.css" rel="stylesheet"> </head> <body> <span data-tooltip data-options="hover_delay: 50;" class="has-tip" title="&lt;script&gt;alert(&quot;Oh crap! XSS'ed&quot;);&lt;/script&gt;">This is a tooltip'ed SPAN</span> <!-- Begin Foundation JavaScript includes //--> <script src="/foundation/js/vendor/jquery.js"></script> <script src="/foundation/js/foundation/foundation.js"></script> <script src="/foundation/js/foundation/foundation.tooltip.js"></script> <script>//<![CDATA[ $(document).foundation(); //]]></script> <!-- End Foundation JavaScript includes //--> </body> </html> When opened in a browser, the encoded HTML from the title-parameter in line 12 will be grabbed by the tooltip plugin and re-decoded to plain HTML in the output, causing the JavaScript to be injected into the page. A JavaScript alert window will pop up. Quick fix/Workaround ==================== The problem lies in line 197 of *foundation.tooltip.js*: var $tip = $(tip_template(this.selector($target), $('<div></div>').html($target.attr('title')).html())), classes = this.inheritable_classes($target); The title attribute is read and provided as HTML without any sanitization. As a quick fix, one could use the .text() function of jQuery to sanitize the read value from the title attribute. This might not be a full fix for the issue, but at least worked in my examples. Here is a diff for quick patching: --- ./foundation.tooltip.js.orig 2016-11-28 16:57:31.000000000 +0100 +++ ./foundation.tooltip.js 2016-11-29 10:45:16.000000000 +0100 @@ -196,3 +196,3 @@ - var $tip = $(tip_template(this.selector($target), $('<div></div>').html($target.attr('title')).html())), + var $tip = $(tip_template(this.selector($target), $('<div></div>').html($target.attr('title').text()).html())), classes = this.inheritable_classes($target); Affected versions ================= Succesfully tested in Zurb Foundation 5.5.1 and 5.5.3 Timeline ======== - 2016-03-01: Opened issue with Zurb - 2016-03-03: Reply from a Foundation DEV and assignment to a different developer to take care - 2016-04-20: Nothing happend, thus I asked for an update on the issue. No reply. - 2016-06-08: Still nothing happend. Asked for an update again. No reply. - 2016-11-28: Still no reply, so I closed the ticket and announced the disclosure - 2016-11-29: Release of this advisory Disclaimer ========== The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. </BODY></HTML>

 

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